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We examine the association between audit quality and the use of collateral in a
sample of Chinese ﬁrms from 2005 to 2011. Using the full sample, we docu-
ment a negative relationship between audit quality and the use of collateral
that is consistent with lenders’ interests. We also show that audit quality and
collateral are regarded as alternative means of reducing debt credit risk. Our
conclusions are robust after using an auditor-switching test, the Heckman
two-stage model and a propensity-score matching model to address endogene-
ity issues. China’s institutional background is also considered. First, we ﬁnd
that in the group of ﬁrms in which large shareholders are able to control bor-
rowers’ activities, the substitution eﬀects between collateral and audit quality
are reduced when the degree of separation between large shareholders’ control
and ownership is high. Second, these substitution eﬀects are greater when the
borrowers’ ultimate controller is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) rather than a
non-state-owned enterprise (NSOE). Third, the diﬀerences in substitution
eﬀects between NSOEs and SOEs are smaller in areas with a high market-
development index. We conclude that the substitution eﬀects are smaller in
high credit risk ﬁrms than in low credit risk ﬁrms.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong.1. Introduction
Bank loans play an important role in borrowers’ external ﬁnancing. Unlike developed foreign markets, China is
undergoing economic transition, as its emerging equity market emerged as recently as 1990. In addition, its publicYat-sen
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long-term debt. Therefore, bank loans are still vital to corporate funding in China. Chen et al. (2010) and Chen and
Xiao (2012) ﬁnd that despite the signiﬁcant growth of China’s equity market, borrowers still rely overwhelmingly on
banks to satisfy their need for capital.1Allen et al. (2005) show that the proportion ofGDP comprised by bank loans
is higher in China than in other developing countries. Moreover, as important intermediaries, banks are vital to the
adjustmentof the allocationof capital. Theyprovidenot only capital loans, butmacroeconomic regulation.Chenand
Li (2011) show that the industries involved inChina’s 5-year support plan have preferential access to capital and exhi-
bit better performance than industries not involved in the plan. We know that bank loans are signiﬁcant not only to
borrowers but to policy makers, as they make a large contribution to the development of China’s economy.
Collateral, together with interest rates, debt maturity and other covenants, is widespread in debt contracts.
It is used to solve the moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems caused by information asymmetry (Bester,
1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Boot et al., 1991). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that collateral is central to the
relationship between lenders and borrowers. Collateral requirements arise from the agency problem that
aﬄicts ﬁnancial relationships, especially with regard to debt ﬁnancing. Collateral is not only an ex-ante mech-
anism of interest alignment but an ex-post mechanism of control allocation, used to supervise borrowers and
to minimize losses when a borrower defaults on a loan repayment (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
External auditing is a useful mechanism of both corporate governance and external supervision. High-qual-
ity auditing can improve the quality of ﬁnancial information (Becker and Defond, 1998; Francis et al., 1999;
Teoh and Wong, 1993; Qi, 2004; Wu and Li, 2006), increase the transparency of accounting information
(Chen and Wang, 2006) and decrease a company’s capital costs (Khurana and Raman, 2004; Pittman and
Fortin, 2004). In addition, many empirical studies show that when making decisions, lenders consider the
quality of accounting information as well as several key ﬁnancial measures (Chen et al., 2010; Rao and
Hu, 2005; Goncharov and Zimmerman, 2007). The quality of accounting information also aﬀects the useful-
ness of a debt contract (Lu et al., 2008). As important stakeholders, lenders can use high-quality external
auditing to decrease credit risk.
However, there is a trade-oﬀ between the use of collateral and the necessity of high-quality auditing.
Although collateral is determined ex-ante, it may incur the costs of screening and monitoring the pledged
assets, as well as disposal expenses and losses due to the sale of specialized assets (Chen et al., 2012). External
audit quality may be aﬀected by many factors, such as the purchasing of audit opinion and the collusion of
auditors with borrowers, which severely depreciate external audit quality. This is not in the interests of lenders.
The question arises of whether lenders use the optimal means to control credit risk when designing debt con-
tracts?2 We focus on collateral in this study, on the grounds that the total number of bank loans is incapable
of reﬂecting bank-loan restrictions, as bank loans can be divided into collateral, guarantor and credit loans
according to their degree of restriction.3 We believe that the use of collateral and guarantor loans more accu-
rately reﬂects our expected relationships between lenders and borrowers, leading to more reliable results. Chen
(2011) uses credit loans to examine the relationship between auditor reputation and borrowers’ bank loans.1 Chen et al. (2012) show that the capital raised from banks each year ranged from RMB 1250 to RMB 3100 billion between 2001 and
2006, whereas the capital raised from the stock market during this period was only between RMB 30 and RMB 250 billion a year. Chen
and Xiao (2012) calculate that the ratios of bank loans and capital raised from the equity market to GDP, and show that the proportion
constituted by bank loans is 75 times greater than that of capital raised from the equity market.
2 We regard collateral as a debt contract issue determined ex-ante, as borrowers use their assets or properties to pledge collateral.
Compared with external auditing, collateral is a better way to prevent credit risk. However, neither collateral nor external audit is free of
costs, and both have some problems. The aim of our study is to examine the degree to which lenders rely on audit quality, which is reﬂected
in the reduction of collateral.
3 Bank loans can be divided into the following categories, according to their level of restriction: collateral loans, guarantor loans and
credit loans. Collateral involves two kinds of loans, namely pledged loans and mortgage loans. A guarantor loan is a loan for which a third
party has joint or guaranteed liability, if the loan defaults. Mortgage loans are bank loans secured on the borrower’s property or the
property of the third party. Pledge loans are secured on the borrower’s or third party’s movable property or rights of claim. If the
borrower defaults on the loan, the lender is permitted to dispose of the pledged or mortgaged properties to cover their losses and prevent
credit risk. Therefore, we believe that collateral and guarantor loans, especially collateral loans are more eﬀective in helping lender to avoid
credit risk. We use the proportion of collateral loans in our main tests, and the proportion of collateral and guarantor loans in our
sensitivity tests.
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collateral and external auditing to minimize credit risks, and are these strategies generally substitutable or
complementary? Black et al. (2004), Nikolaev (2010) and Chen et al. (2012) examine this problem, but fail
to reach the same conclusions. Second, how does China’s institutional background aﬀect the relationship
between audit quality and collateral? The country’s ﬁrms are dominated by large shareholders, shareholders
are highly concentrated and lenders are ineﬀectively protected (Xiao, 2007). Therefore, we consider the extent
of large shareholders’ control and the degree of separation of the controlling owner’s control and ownership.
We also address the nature of the ultimate controller and the market-development index, as we wish to deter-
mine how China’s institutional background aﬀects lenders’ decisions, speciﬁcally with regard to the relation-
ship between the use of collateral and external auditing.
The ﬁrst empirical study of the ultimate controller and the agency problem between controlling owners and
minority shareholders was conducted by La Porta et al. (1999). Researchers examining the role of large share-
holders tend to hold two distinct views: one set of researchers emphasize alignment eﬀects (Kanga and
Shivdasani, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998), the other highlights entrenchment eﬀects (Claessens et al.,
2000). Xiao (2007) and La Porta et al. (1999) ﬁnd that borrowers have a highly concentrated, rather than dis-
persed ownership structure, especially in developing countries. A large shareholder leverages control through
stock pyramids or cross-shareholdings while keeping his or her level of ownership low, which results in a high
level of separation between control and ownership (Luo and Tang, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999). The motivation
for separating control and ownership has two further dimensions, depending on the role of the large share-
holder. First, alignment and risk-diversiﬁcation (Pan and Yu, 2012); and second, the agency problem and
entrenchment (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson, 2000). Although the separation of control and ownership has
a considerable inﬂuence on the agency problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders (Su
and Zhu, 2003; Yu and Xia, 2003a, 2003b), we should also consider the basic premise that the large shareholder
has a high level of control (Pan and Yu, 2012; Fan and Wong, 2002; Morck et al., 2005). If we directly examine
the relationship between the agency problem and the separation of control and ownership, without considering
this important premise, we may draw unreliable conclusions. Therefore, we need to determine whether the large
shareholder has a high level of control, before examining the relationship between the agency problems and the
separation of control and ownership. Xiao (2007) and Chen and Wang (2010) note that the ultimate controller
may be either a state-owned or non-state-owned borrower. SOEs and NSOEs have many diﬀerent character-
istics (Cull and Xu, 2005; Chen et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2007; Lin and Li, 2004). For instance, SOEs have more
opportunities than NSOEs to obtain capital, but face a lower credit risk (Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia et al.,
2011). Unlike the developed markets in Western countries, China’s regional economic development is unbal-
anced, with vast diﬀerences between regions in terms of legal development and marketization (Yu and Pan,
2008; Fan andWang, 2009). With greater legal development and marketization, decisions regarding bank loans
are more marketized, and more independent of government power (Jiang and Li, 2006; Fang, 2007; Yu and
Pan, 2008a, 2008b; Wei and Shen, 2009). As a result, SOEs face greater credit risk.
We ﬁnd that the use of collateral and high-quality external auditing are regarded as substitutes by lenders
making decisions about bank loans. We notice that in the group of ﬁrms whose large shareholders are capable
of controlling borrowers, these substitution eﬀects are reduced when the degree of separation of control and
ownership is high. In the other group, however, the substitution eﬀects are not found to increase. We show
that the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing are greater in SOEs, but we also prove
that a higher market development index can reduce the diﬀerences between SOEs and NSOEs.
This study makes several potential contributions to the literature. First, we take a novel perspective in
examining how lenders protect themselves by inﬂuencing borrowers’ activities through high-quality auditing
and collateral requirements. Most prior studies have addressed this problem from the borrower’s perspective,
and conclude that high-quality auditing helps borrowers to obtain bank loans and reduce the cost of borrow-
ing. For example, Hu and Tang (2007) notes the relationship between interest rates and auditing. Liao et al.
(2010) use going-concern opinions to examine the role of auditors. Our results show that lenders use high-
quality auditing and collateral requirements to inﬂuence borrowers’ actions; high-quality auditing and collat-
eral are regarded as substitutes, and their substitution eﬀects are adjusted according to the credit risk of the
borrower, which depends on the institutional environment. Second, our study enriches the existing literature
on the determinants of collateral. Prior researchers note that collateral is aﬀected by the degree of information
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lenders and borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992), the level of competition in the loan market (Besanko and
Thakor, 1987), and the costs (beneﬁts) of screening borrowers (Manove and Padilla, 1999; Manove et al.,
2001). We note that high-quality external auditing decreases the use of collateral and that the extent of this
decrease depends on the level of credit risk. Third, our study contributes to existing research on large share-
holders’ separation of control and ownership. Although Prior researchers have used the separation of control
and ownership to examine entrenchment, agency or alignment eﬀects, few studies have addressed its ﬁnancial
consequences, such as the cost of borrowing. Lin et al. (2011) sample ﬁrms from a number of foreign coun-
tries’ to examine the relationship between the degree of separation of control and ownership and the cost of
borrowing, as reﬂected in interest-rate spreads. We divide our sample into two groups to examine the inﬂuence
of the degree of separation of control and ownership on the relationship between collateral and high-quality
auditing. Our results indicate that in high control group, the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-
quality auditing are only weakened when the degree of separation of control and ownership is high. However,
we do not ﬁnd these eﬀects to be stronger in the low-control group, when the degree of separation of control
and ownership is high. Our evidence oﬀers insight into the incentives for and consequences of large sharehold-
ers’ separation of control and ownership. Finally, following Armstrong et al. (2010) and Skinner (2011), we
examine the interaction between various aspects of debt contracts to determine, speciﬁcally, whether they
are substitutable or complementary. We seek to ascertain whether various mechanisms are used as alternatives
or complements. Prior researchers have noticed the relationships between collateral and other contracting
issues and characteristics and the quality of accounting (Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010; Chen et al., 2012;
Black et al., 2004). The focus of our study is the use of an external monitoring mechanism, namely, external
auditing. We examine the relationship between external auditing and the use of collateral, and then investigate
the eﬀects on this relationship of diﬀerent levels of credit risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We develop our hypotheses in Section 2, and present the
research design, sample selection and data in Section 3. We present the results of our main tests in Section 4
and results of our sensitivity tests in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.2. Development of hypotheses
According to contract theory and agency theory, an enterprise is formed from the combination of various
kinds of contracts. During the design and implementation process, proper monitoring mechanisms should be
used to align stakeholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The focus of our study is the agency prob-
lem between lenders and borrowers, whose conﬂicts of interest mainly concern asset substitution (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), under-investment (Myers, 1977) and equity delusion (Smith and Warner, 1979), speciﬁcally
the fear that borrowers will expropriate lenders. The aim of our study is to determine whether a lender will
adjust the use of collateral when he or she knows the borrower’s audit quality, and whether the degree of
adjustment is always the same.2.1. Collateral and audit quality
From the perspective of self-protection, agency costs can be decreased by using alignment mechanisms to
solve the agency problem between lenders and borrower. Collateral and external auditing are two such mech-
anisms. The use of collateral is necessitated by information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, and is
a common component of bank loans (Yang and Qian, 2008). Bester (1985) and Chan and Kanatas (1985) ﬁnd
that in conditions of information asymmetry, collateral can reduce interest rates and may be regarded as a
signal of better credit quality. Many researchers have focused on the role of external audit. Becker and
Defond (1998) and Francis (1999) note that the clients of Big-four audit ﬁrms have lower discretional accruals
than the clients of non-Big-4 ﬁrms. Qi et al. (2004) and Wu and Li (2006) test the Big-4 measure of audit qual-
ity and ﬁnd that the Big-4 audit ﬁrms do provide a high audit quality. Teoh and Wong (1993) note that clients
of the Big-4 have a higher earnings-response coeﬃcient than clients of other audit ﬁrms. Khurana and Raman
(2004) report that the use of a Big-4 ﬁrm can reduce the cost of both equity capital and debt (Pittman and
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information and decrease information risks, helping lenders to make decisions.
In addition, lenders that pay serious attention to borrowers’ ﬁnancial information are found to make better
decisions (Goncharov and Zimmerman, 2007), and thus alleviate credit risk. Chen et al. (2010) ﬁnd that many
debt contracts are available, based on diﬀerent accounting measures. Rao and Hu (2005) document the roles
of ﬁnancial measures and accounting information in lenders’ decision making, and show that lenders fre-
quently consider borrowers’ information. Grama et al. (2008) ﬁnd that lenders are likely to give more severe
debt contracts to borrowers involved in ﬁnancial restatements. Lu et al. (2008) report that earnings manage-
ment impairs the eﬀectiveness of debt contracts.
In addition, Chen et al. (2012) show that the use of collateral incurs the costs of screening and monitoring
the pledged assets, as well as disposal expenses; it also brings lenders’ losses due to the sale of specialized
assets. Manove and Padilla (1999) observe that lenders generally seek to give capital to high-quality borrow-
ers, but when costs, beneﬁts and the level of competition are taken into consideration, lenders’ decisions are
unlikely to be so prudential; even in an undeveloped bank-loans market, lenders regard the use of collateral as
a substitute for ineﬀective monitoring (Manove et al., 2001). When designing debt contracts, do lenders use the
optimal means to control credit risk? Does the tradeoﬀ between costs and beneﬁts inﬂuence lenders’ decisions?
Finally, the relationship between debt contract issues and other mechanisms remains an empirical problem.
Hu and Tang (2007) documents that higher-quality audit opinions and larger auditor oﬃces reduce interest
rates and increase the maturity of debt. Chen (2011) ﬁnds that auditors’ reputation the number and proportion
of borrowers’ credit bank loans increases as the auditor’s reputation increases. Black et al. (2004) use a bank-
industry sample to prove that external regulation and debt covenants are substitutable, whereas, Nikolaev
(2010) ﬁnds that conservatism and debt covenants are complementary. Chen et al. (2012) show that lenders
generally regard collateral and conservatism as substitutable, but when the borrower has a low credit quality
or a high proportion of intangible assets, the lender will reverse this assumption, regarding collateral and con-
servatism as complementary. As the studies above are not in complete accordance, we rely on our empirical
analysis to identify the more accurate of the following two alternatives.
H1a. Collateral requirements are positively related to high-quality external auditing.
H1b. Collateral requirements are negatively related to high-quality external auditing.2.2. Collateral, separation of control and ownership and audit quality
The ﬁrst empirical studies of the ultimate controller and the agency problem between controlling owners
and minority shareholders were conducted by La Ports et al. (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1999).
According to La Porta et al. (1999) the agency problem that arises between large shareholders and minority
shareholders has become more severe than that between shareholders and managers. Researchers examining
the role of large stockholders tend to emphasize either alignment eﬀects or entrenchment eﬀects (Claessens
et al., 2000). Kanga and Shivdasani (1995) note that large stockholders can alleviate the “free-rider” problem
associated with minority shareholders, and large shareholders have an incentive to monitor managers (Kahn
and Winton, 1998). Theses scholars conclude that the presence of large shareholders can improve corporate
governance by preventing managers from acting in their self-interest. However, these studies are based on
the ownership structure of U.S. ﬁrms, which are highly dispersed. Samples of ﬁrms from other countries show
that ownership structures in these areas are not dispersed but highly concentrated, especially in developing
countries (La Porta et al., 1999; Franks and Mayer, 1998; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). Xiao (2007) notes
that Chinese ﬁrms have a highly concentrated ownership structure, usually dominated by a single large stock-
holder. This large shareholder has the incentive to leverage control through stock pyramids or cross-share-
holdings while minimizing his or her ownership, which results in a high level of separation of control and
ownership (Luo and Tang, 2008; La Porta et al., 1999). This separation of control and ownership has received
considerable attention from scholars. The empirical research pertaining to the incentives for and consequences
of separating control and ownership can be divided into two groups. The researchers in the ﬁrst group agree
that a high level of separation of control and ownership can result in an alignment of interests by encouraging
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supervise a large number of managers, due to diversiﬁcation. This reduces investment risk (Pan and Yu, 2012).
The researchers in the other group document that a large degree of separation of control and ownership can
help large shareholders to expropriate from minority shareholders through tunneling activities, leading to
agency or entrenchment eﬀects (Johnson et al., 2000). Su and Zhu (2003) observe that large stockholders
can cause severe agency problems for borrowers, as large shareholders may expropriate from minority share-
holders by increasing their separation of control and ownership. This increases both credit risk and the like-
lihood of remaining in ﬁnancial distress (Lin et al., 2011).
However, directly examining the relationship between the agency problem and the degree of separation of
control and ownership without considering the control rights of the large shareholder may lead to unreliable
results. Fan and Wong (2002) and Morck et al. (2005) document that the large shareholder can only engage in
tunneling activities to gain private beneﬁts and thereby reduce company value if he or she has considerable
control rights. Majority control may even be required. Pan and Yu (2012) concur that substantial control
rights are required for a large shareholder to engage in tunneling; also they show that the degree of entrench-
ment and alignment diﬀers according to the level of control. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ﬁnd that when a large
shareholder is capable of controlling the borrower, he or she is more likely to force a manager to engage in
asset substitution and expropriate from the lender. However, the authors also show that this would result
in a high credit risk and increase the likelihood of remaining in ﬁnancial distress (Lin et al., 2011).We thus
predict that in the high-control group, the entrenchment and agency eﬀects will be stronger than the alignment
eﬀects when the degree of separation of control and ownership is high, resulting in higher credit risk. In con-
trast, we predict the alignment eﬀects will be stronger than the entrenchment and agency eﬀects in the low-con-
trol group when the degree of separation of control and ownership is high. We thus expect a high degree of
separation of control and ownership to improve corporate governance, as it may encourage large shareholders
to monitor managers and improve the eﬃciency of investment.
From the perspective of lenders’ self-protection and considering the tradeoﬀ between costs and beneﬁts, a
lender is more likely to regard external auditing and collateral as substitutes for a borrower with lower credit
risk when a borrower chooses a high-quality auditor. In this way, the lender can minimize risk. Even when the
borrower’s credit risk is extremely high, the lender is able to regard external auditing and collateral as com-
plementary. We thus test the following hypotheses empirically.
H2. When the large shareholder is able to control the borrower and the degree of separation of control and
ownership is higher, the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing are weaker.
H3. When the large shareholder is unable to control the borrower and the degree of separation of control and
ownership is higher, the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing are stronger.2.3. Collateral, nature of controller, market development and audit quality
There are two distinct groups of Chinese ﬁrms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enter-
prises (NSOEs). Since 1978, China has sought to convert SOEs from ﬁrms whose sole proprietor is the state to
modernWestern-style corporations (Cull and Xu, 2005). Although many decision rights have been delegated to
the corporatized SOEs, the government retains the ultimate rights to make decisions about the disposal of
assets and mergers and acquisitions undertaken by listed ﬁrms, as well as the right to appoint the CEOs. As
SOEs lack the right to dispose of state assets, they are subsidized by the government when they face ﬁnancial
distress. Nevertheless, the CEOs of SOEs have multiple responsibilities (Chen et al., 2010). The promotion and
compensation of CEOs of SOEs’ are determined more by their success in fulﬁlling various political and social
objectives than by their ﬁrms’ operating and accounting performance (Fan et al., 2007). Li and Li (2004) ﬁnd
that SOEs face more divergent policy burdens than NSOEs, which lead to soft-budget constraints. The implicit
insurance provided by the government and its control over state-owned banks are important sources of existing
soft-budget constraints. Despite these constraints, SOEs have a lower credit risk. First, as the Chinese govern-
ment has been engaged in the corporatization or partial privatization of these enterprises, it has an incentive to
ensure that they remain ﬁnancially sound. Second, the competition for listing in China is extremely intense;
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pared with NSOEs, SOEs have preferential access to capital; speciﬁcally, they have more opportunities to
obtain capital and their capital costs are lower (Allen et al., 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011).
Unlike the developed markets in Western countries, China’s regional economic development is unbalanced;
there are substantial diﬀerences between regions in terms of legal development and marketization (Yu and
Pan, 2008; Fan and Wang, 2009). This makes China’s institutional setting a natural forum in which to study
the relationship between market development and the diﬀerences in substitution eﬀects between SOEs and
NSOEs (Wang et al., 2008). Jiang and Li (2006) note that when the government has little power over bank
loans and ﬁnancing activities are well developed, the diﬀerences between SOEs and NSOEs in terms of bank
loans are reduced. According to Fang (2007), decision making regarding bank loans is more marketized and
independent when the institutional environment is improved, government power over bank loans is decreased
and soft-budget constraints are relaxed. Under such conditions, lenders are likely to give SOEs more severe
debt contracts, alleviating the ﬁnancial discrimination associated with the nature of ownership. Yu and Pan
(2008a) ﬁnd that NSOEs’ political relationships may aﬀect bank loans and that these eﬀects are stronger when
the levels of ﬁnancing and legal development are low. SOEs’ bank loans are negatively related to the levels of
ﬁnancing and legal development, which contradicts the ﬁndings of La Porta et al. (1998) in “Law and
Finance.” Wei and Shen (2009) ﬁnd that when the degree of government intervention is high, SOEs are less
able to obtain credit loans when lenders are well protected. We expect an increase in market development to
decrease the supportive eﬀects of government intervention in SOEs’ bank loans.
When SOEs choose high-quality auditors, lender decrease their collateral requirements to reduce credit
risk; the degree of adjustment is also larger for SOEs than NSOEs. With the development of the market envi-
ronment, the degree of government intervention in lenders’ decisions decreases, which increases the credit risk
faced by SOEs. In a region with more developed markets, the gap in collateral requirements between SOEs
and NSOEs is smaller than that in less developed regions. We thus test the following hypotheses empirically.
H4. The substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing are stronger in SOEs than NSOEs.
H5. When market-development index is higher, the enhancement eﬀects of SOEs are weaker.3. Research design
3.1. Measurement of main variables
3.1.1. Measurement of collateral
Collateral is the proportion of collateral loans, that is calculated as the ratio of total loans collateralized to
total loans outstanding at the end of the year. We do not use a dummy variable for collateral. The information
on bank loans is obtained fromﬁnancial statements. In themain tests, we use the proportion of collateral loans to
measure collateral; in the sensitivity tests, we use the proportion of collateral loans plus that of guarantor loans.4
3.1.2. Measurement of audit quality
Researchers have used a range of variables to measure audit quality, such as the size of the oﬃce (reputa-
tion) (DeAngelo, 1981). Clients of Big-4 audit ﬁrms have lower discretional accruals and higher earnings
response coeﬃcients than the clients of non-Big-4 ﬁrms (Becker and Defond, 1998; Francis, 1999; Teoh
and Wong, 1993). Following Hu and Tang (2007) and Wu (2006) we use accounting-ﬁrm size as a dummy
variable to measure audit quality. If the ﬁrm is in the Big-4 or Big-10, the dummy variable is 1; otherwise,
it is 0. However, some researchers regard accounting-ﬁrm size as a poor proxy for audit quality, and it is4 Bank loans can be divided into collateral loans, guarantor loans and credit loans, according to their level of restriction. The use of
collateral involves two kinds of loans: pledged loans and mortgage loans. We use the proportion of collateral loans to measure the use of
collateral. Some scholars use the proportion of collateral and guarantor loans to measure collateral (Chen and Xiao, 2012), and we have
noticed that the information on bank loans disclosed in ﬁnancial reports, sometimes are related to “collateral and guarantee loans.”
Therefore, we use the proportion of collateral loans to measure collateral in our main tests, and the proportion of collateral and guarantor
loans in our sensitivity tests. Our predictions are generally well supported.
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(Liu and Zhou, 2007). We use discretional accruals to solve these problems. First, we divide the full sample
into two groups according to audit quality and then compare the means of the two groups to determine
whether the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant.
3.2. Main test models
In H1a and H1b, we predict that collateral and audit quality are negatively and positively related, respec-
tively. We use the models developed by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Chen et al. (2012) to test these hypoth-
eses, as follows.5
Model 1:5 In
attenti
additio
of aud
ModelCollateralt ¼ a0 þ a1Auditt1 þ a2Soet þ a3Wedget þ a4Levt þ a5Sizet þ a6Roat þ a7Intcovt
þ a8Growtht þ a9Currentt þ a10Aget þ a11Guarant þ a12Ltdebtt þ a13Goet
þ a14Intangiblet þ a15Cfovolt þ a16Debtcovt þ a17Salescasht þ ai;jYeari;j þ ai;jIndi;j þ ei;jWe expect the sign of a1 to be signiﬁcantly negative or positive. In Model 1, we use Soe as a control variable
because we expect SOEs to be less likely than NSOEs to provide collateral for their debt. We thus expect the
sign of Soe to be negative. We also include leverage and the percentage of long-term debt in Model 1, because
we expect these variables to be positively related to collateral. To address ﬁrm performance, operational risk
and solvency, we add the following variables in Model 1: return on assets, natural logarithm of total assets,
interest-coverage ratio, growth of assets and current ratio. We also use the number of years since the ﬁrm’s
establishment to control for the bank-ﬁrm relationship, because the results of previous literature indicate that
the bank-ﬁrm relationship can solve the information-asymmetry problem and decrease the use of collateral.
However, others believe that banks’ information superiority enables them to ask for high interest, thereby
exacerbating the agency problem. Therefore the relationship between collateral and age is expected to be either
negative or positive. We predict that the sign of the market-development index, a proxy for market develop-
ment, will be positive, because the higher the level of competition, the more likely the use of collateral. We use
the percentage of intangible assets, the volatility of net operating cash ﬂow, the debt coverage and the sales
cash ﬂow ratio to control for the ability to provide collateral and the operating cash ﬂow. Finally, we use year
and industry dummy variables to control for year and industry factors.
Model 2:Collateralt ¼ a0 þ a1Auditt1 þ a2Wedget þ a3Auditt1 Wedget þ a4Soet þ a5Levt þ a6Sizet þ a7Roat
þ a8Intcovt þ a9Growtht þ a10Currentt þ a11Aget þ a12Guarant þ a13Ltdebtt þ a14Goet
þ a15Intangiblet þ a16Cfovolt þ a17Debtcovþ a18Salescasht þ ai;jYeari;j þ ai;jIndi;j þ ei;jWe use Model 2 to examine H2 and H3. We predict that if the large shareholder has a high level of control,
a3 will be signiﬁcantly positive; if the large shareholder has a low level of control, we expect a3 to be signif-
icantly negative.
Model 3:Collateralt ¼ a0 þ a1Auditt1 þ a2Soet þ a3Wedget þ a4Auditt1  Soet þ a5Auditt1  Soet Goet
þ a6Levt þ a7Sizet þ a8Roat þ a9Intcovt þ a10Growtht þ a11Currentt þ a12Aget
þ a13Guarant þ a14Ltdebtt þ a15Goet þ a16Intangiblet þ a17Cfovolt þ a18Debtcovt
þ a19Salescasht þ ai;jYeari;j þ ai;jIndi;j þ ei;jaccordance with the reviewers’ suggestions, we use the debt-coverage ratio to proxy for cash ﬂow, because lenders pay considerable
on to cash ﬂow. We also use the percentage of intangible assets to control for the borrowers’ ability to provide collateral. In
n, we adjust the framework of our main results in the following ways. First, we test the signiﬁcance of H1. Second, we use a measure
itor change, Heckman two-stage model and the PSM technique as robustness tests and to address endogeneity issues. Finally, we use
2 and Model 3 to test H2, H3, H4 and H5.
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signiﬁcantly positive, respectively.
3.3. Sample selection and data
We use a sample of listed A-share Chinese ﬁrms from 2005 to 2011. Our sample selection process is as fol-
lows. First, we omit the ST, *ST and PT ﬁrms, as they are fail to provide the necessary information to examine
the relationship between collateral and high audit quality. Next, we omit ﬁrms from the ﬁnance industry,
because these do not ﬁt our aims of examining bank loans. We then omit ﬁrms with listings later than
2006 and ﬁrms with fewer than three ﬁrm-year observations. In addition, we omit ﬁrms whose ultimate con-
trolling shareholder cannot be identiﬁed. Finally, we eliminate observations that provide insuﬃcient data to
calculate audit quality or Z-scores, ﬁrms with zero bank loans, and ﬁrms for which we are unable to identify
major loan sources or the number of collateral loans at the end of the year. After eliminating these observa-
tions, we have 4877 observations from 828 ﬁrms, of which SOEs comprise 3148 observations and NSOEs pro-
vide 1729.6 We winsorize several of the control variables at the 1% level. Our data on collateral and guarantor
loans, audit quality, ultimate controlling shareholders and other ﬁnancial details are obtained from the Chi-
nese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database (see Table 1).
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics for main variables
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Table 2 reveals that the mean of proportion of collateral in the full sample is 0.420, which diﬀers from Chen
et al.’s (2012) results of 0.262 for a sample of ﬁrms from 2001 to 2006.The mean of proportion of collateral and
guarantor loans together is 0.74, which is consistent with Chen and Xiao’s (2012) ﬁndings. This result indicates
that collateral and/or guarantor loans are widespread in debt contracts. Firms with a high audit quality com-
prise 30% of our sample; that is, appropriately one third of the ﬁrms sampled have chosen international Big-4
or domestic Big-10 auditors. SOEs comprise 64.5% of the sample. There are large diﬀerences between the max-
imum and minimum values for the other control variables, such as, interest coverage, market development,
number of years since the ﬁrm was established and separation of control and ownership. This result indicates
that these characteristics diﬀer between ﬁrms, which are consistent with the literature.7 Our descriptive statis-
tics for the main variables are generally consistent with those presented by Chen et al. (2012).
Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for ﬁrms divided according to audit quality.
Table 3 displays the diﬀerences in means between the groups and the results of t-tests. The mean discretion-
ary accruals diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the groups, which suggest that our choice of criteria to build the high
audit quality variable is appropriate for our sample. The proportion of collateral is signiﬁcantly higher in the
low audit quality group than in the high-quality group. This is preliminary proof of Hypothesis 1, in which we
predict that collateral and audit quality are regarded as alternatives. We also ﬁnd that with the exception of
the current ratio, proportion of guarantor loans, leverage and separation of control and ownership, the mean
of the variables are signiﬁcantly higher in the high audit quality group, than in the low-quality group.
Table 4 lists descriptive statistics for the dummy variables for separation of control and owner-ship, large
shareholders’ control rights and market development.6 The sample used in the draft paper comprised 4919 observations. Following the reviewers’ recommendations, we have added several
variables to our model, and thus have lost 42 observations (due to missing data) to give 4877 observations, of which 3148 pertain to SOEs
and 1729 to Non-SOEs.
7 These results are not winsorized, because we use dummy variables for market development and separation of ownership and control in
the main tests. The reviewers also note the problems with the interest-coverage ratio and the measure of separation of ownership and
control. In the descriptive statistics, we state that a continuous variable is used to represent the degree of separation of ownership and
control, with a mean of 6.783. The mean degree of separation of ownership and control is thus 6.783%. The data are collected directly from
the CSMAR database and our method is as described by La Porta (1997). The interest-coverage ratio is calculated as= EBIT/interest
expenses.
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of variables.
Variables Deﬁnitions
Collateral Collater1: proportion of collateral loans in total outstanding loans at the end of the year
Collater2: proportion of collateral and guarantor loans at the end of the year
Audit Auditor dummy variable, equal to 1 if the auditor was an international Big-4 or domestic Big-10 ﬁrm in the previous year,
and otherwise 0
Discretional accruals in the previous year, calculated from the modiﬁed Jones model
Change Change1: auditor-change dummy variable, equal to 1 if the client has switched from a non-international Big-4 or non-
domestic Big-10 audit ﬁrm to an international Big-4 or domestic Big-10, and otherwise 0
Change2: auditor-change dummy variable, equal to 1 if auditor has switched from an international Big-4 or domestic Big-
10 audit ﬁrm to another auditor, and otherwise 0
Wedge Dummy variable for separation of control and ownership. Mean, median and the 2/3 measure are used as criteria to
classify the variable. In the main tests, we use the 2/3 measure as the criterion; in the sensitivity tests, we use mean and
median as the criteria
Wedge1 Continuous variable of separation of control and ownership
Control Dummy variable for large shareholders’ level of control, with 25% and 30% as criteria. In the main tests, we use the 30%
measure to distinguish between high and low control rights levels; in the sensitivity tests, we use 25% as the criterion
Current Current ratio, calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities
Lev Leverage, calculated as total assets divided by total liabilities
Intcov Interest-coverage ratio, calculated as income before interest and tax expenses divided by interest expenses
Roa Return on assets at the end of the year
Ltdebt Percentage of long-term debt, calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to total loans outstanding at the end of the year
Guaran Proportion of guarantor loans, calculated as the ratio of guarantor loans to total loans outstanding at the end of the year
Size Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Soe Nature of the controller, which equals 1 if the ﬁrm is an SOE, and otherwise 0
Age Number of years since the ﬁrm was established.
Geo Dummy variable for market development; mean, median and a 2/3 measure are used as criteria. In the main tests, we use
the median as our criterion; in the sensitivity tests, we use the median and the 2/3 measure as criteria
Geo1 Continuous variable of market development.
Growth Growth in total assets, calculated as the diﬀerence between ending total assets and beginning total assets, divided by
beginning total assets
Intangible Proportion of the intangible assets at the end of the year
Cfovol Standard deviation of the net operating cash ﬂow in the previous three years, a proxy for volatility of operating cash ﬂow
Debtcov Debt-coverage ratio, calculated as the total amount borrowed divided by the net operating cash ﬂow, a proxy for operating
cash ﬂow
Salescash Sales cash ﬂow ratio, calculated as operating income divided by net operating cash ﬂow, a proxy for operating cash ﬂow
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Min. Median P75 Max.
Collateral 0.420 0 0.344 0.761 1
Auditor 0.297 0 0 1 1
Soe 0.645 0 1 1 1
Wedge1 6.801 0 0.514 13.59 44.48
Guaran 0.319 0 0.221 0.580 1
Ltdebt 0.321 0 0.249 0.550 1
Ltdebt 8.462 0.380 8.420 10.42 11.80
Geo1 0.129 0.353 0.0898 0.219 1.086
Lev 0.560 0.189 0.559 0.668 1.399
Roa 0.0332 0.181 0.0294 0.0574 0.211
Size 21.74 19.13 21.65 22.41 24.81
Current 1.204 0.191 1.099 1.470 3.727
Age 12.83 5 13 16 23
Intcov 8.524 11.92 3.534 7.935 131.6
Cfovol 0.0410 0.00224 0.0304 0.0527 0.328
Intangible 0.0490 0 0.0306 0.0614 0.354
Debtcov 0.104 0.499 0.0861 0.177 1.414
Salescash 0.0803 1.596 0.0731 0.160 0.962
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics by audit quality.
Variables Auditor = 0 Auditor = 1 Diﬀ. in mean t-Test
Mean Median Mean Median
DA 0.106 0.078 0.096 0.077 0.010 3.020***
Collateral 0.459 0.403 0.329 0.228 0.130 11.59***
Soe 0.621 1 0.704 1 0.083 5.586***
Wedge1 6.727 0.590 6.978 0.411 0.251 0.913
Geo 8.348 8.140 8.732 8.770 0.384 5.981***
Guaran 0.316 0.213 0.325 0.237 0.009 0.877
Ltdebt 0.303 0.226 0.364 0.319 0.061 6.463***
Growth 0.118 0.078 0.155 0.117 0.037 5.059***
Lev 0.559 0.555 0.563 0.566 0.006 0.766
Roa 0.031 0.027 0.040 0.035 0.009 5.322***
Size 21.57 21.52 22.17 22.03 0.600 17.76***
Current 1.202 1.093 1.209 1.115 0.007 0.367
Age 12.48 12 13.66 13 1.180 9.724***
Intcov 8.045 3.333 9.658 4.073 1.613 2.802***
Cfovol 0.043 0.031 0.038 0.029 0.005 4.179***
Intangible 0.049 0.030 0.048 0.032 0.001 0.780
Debtcov 0.108 0.090 0.094 0.076 0.014 2.447**
Salescash 0.084 0.077 0.071 0.062 0.013 1.752
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and ownership, the mean and 2/3 values do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the groups. Neither the mean nor
the 2/3 values are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for market development. When 25% is chosen as a criterion, high-con-
trol ﬁrms represent 73.7% of the sample, whereas the 30% criterion yields 60.2% of high-control ﬁrms. There-
fore, we use 30% as the criterion in the main tests, and 25% in the sensitivity tests.4.2. Correlation coeﬃcients of main variables
Table 5 lists the correlation coeﬃcients of the main variables.
The results displayed in Table 5 show that the correlation between collateral and audit quality is negative
(0.1638), which is consistent with our prediction. SOEs are less likely than NSOEs to pledge collateral
(0.2491), which makes them better able to obtain credit loans. Moreover, SOEs have longer debt maturity,
which is reﬂected in the high proportion of long-term debt (0.0593). Our results support the conclusion that
long-term debt is more diﬃcult to monitor than short-term debt. We ﬁnd the level of market development to
be negatively related to collateral (0.0995), which indicates that when lenders are better protected, borrowers
are less likely to pledge collateral. Debt maturity is signiﬁcantly longer in the high audit quality group than in
the low-quality group (0.0922), which proves that external auditing may aﬀect borrowers’ debt maturity.
Despite the high correlation between collateral and guarantor loans (0.5628), the other data are reasonable;
there is no evidence of multicollinearity.4.3. Main results
After controlling for year and industry factors, we use Model 1, 2 and 3 to examine H1, H2, H3, H4 and
H5. First, we use Model 1 to test H1; next, we use auditor switching, the Heckman two-stage model and pro-
pensity-score matching (PSM) as robustness tests; ﬁnally, we use Model 2 and 3 to test H2 to H5.4.3.1. H1 and endogeneity issues
Tables 6 and 7 list the results of testing H1 and the sensitivity tests. The ﬁrst column displays the results for
Model 1. We ﬁnd the relationship between collateral and audit quality to be signiﬁcantly negative at the 1%
level (0.0649, t-stat. = 8.18). Thus, H1b is supported, because collateral and high-quality auditing are
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the dummy variables for separation of control and ownership, large shareholders’ control rights and market
development.
Variables Grouping criteria Mean Median Min. Max. Std.
Wedgea Mean 0.381 0 0 1 0.486
Median 0.500 1 0 1 0.500
2/3 0.334 0 0 1 0.472
Whether Exists 0.515 1 0 1 0.500
Control 25% 0.737 1 0 1 0.440
30% 0.602 1 0 1 0.490
Geo Mean 0.498 0 0 1 0.500
Median 0.489 0 0 1 0.500
2/3 0.332 0 0 1 0.471
a The reviewers recommended that we proxy for the degree of separation of ownership and control using a dummy variable indicating
the existence of separation between ownership and control. We provide the descriptive statistics for this dummy variable in Table 4.
Table 5
Correlation coeﬃcients of main variables.
Collateral Auditor Soe Geo1 Wedg1 Guaran Ltdebt
Collateral 1
Auditor 0.1638* 1
(0.000)
Soe 0.2491* 0.0798* 1
(0.000) (0.000)
Geo1 0.0995* 0.0854* 0.0814* 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wedge1 0.0134 0.0131 0.3343* 0.00850 1
(0.351) (0.361) (0.000) (0.553)
Guaran 0.5628* 0.0126 0.0111 0.0538* 0.0738* 1
(0.000) (0.381) (0.438) (0.000) (0.000)
Ltdebt 0.0593* 0.0922* 0.0769* 0.1070* 0.00950 0.0955* 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.506) (0.000)
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all signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In addition, we ﬁnd that the number of years since establishment and the current
ratio are positively related to collateral, which is not the expected result. SOEs are likely to pledge less collat-
eral than NSOEs. High leverage, low return on assets, small size, a low level of market development and a high
proportion of long-term debt all increase the likelihood of a ﬁrm using collateral. Interestingly, the degree of
separation of control and ownership is not signiﬁcant even at the 10% level, but this outcome is consistent with
our prediction. Prior researchers note that the incentives to separate control and ownership are mixed. Such a
separation may improve alignment and reduce risk by increasing the eﬃciency of monitoring (Pan and Yu,
2012), or cause agency and entrenchment eﬀects through tunneling activities; the relationship between these
two sets of eﬀects cannot be simply negative or positive.
The self-selection problem is a type of endogeneity problem regularly encountered in studies of auditors,
especially when the size of an audit ﬁrm is used to measure audit quality, as in our study. Borrowers are likely
to have certain preferences when choosing auditors, which may result in biased samples, in turn aﬀecting the
accuracy and validity of the results. An auditor-switching sensitivity test of auditor change can partly solve the
self-selection problem. Following previous literature, we also use the two-stage Heckman (1979) model to pro-
vide a fuller solution to the problem. The second column of Table 6 provides the results of the Heckman two-
stage method. When the inverse Mills ratio is added to the equation, collateral and audit quality are again
found to be signiﬁcantly negatively related. In the ﬁrst stage, we use a probit regression to test not only the
control variables in Model 1, but other variables such as the ratio of receivables and inventory to total assets,
and a dummy variable for audit opinion in the previous year. However, we report only the results of the sec-
Table 6
Results for H1.
(1) (2) (3)
H1 Heckman Change
Auditor 0.0694*** 0.0788*** Change1 0.0219*
(8.18) (9.16) (1.86)
Soe 0.119*** 0.129*** Change2 0.102***
(12.84) (11.79) (3.14)
Wedge 0.00253 0.00605 Guaran 0.692***
(0.30) (0.70) (60.41)
Lev 0.117*** 0.149*** Ltdebt 0.112***
(4.35) (5.00) (8.11)
Roa 0.494*** 0.413*** Intangible 0.0969
(5.75) (3.71) (1.62)
Size 0.0755*** 0.0498*** Cfovol 0.0327***
(18.33) (2.84) (3.00)
Growth 0.00485 0.00806 Debtcov 0.00599
(0.26) (0.38) (0.49)
Current 0.0190** 0.0374*** Salescash 2.44e05
(2.39) (4.64) (0.24)
Age 0.00389*** 0.00663*** Growth 0.00514
(3.85) (6.69) (1.15)
Intcov 0.000107 6.56e05 Lev 0.00481**
(0.46) (0.27) (2.50)
Geo 0.0517*** 0.0322*** Intcov 7.61e06
(6.75) (3.23) (0.17)
Guaran 0.609*** 0.612*** Roa 0.0544**
(52.46) (51.82) (2.37)
Ltdebt 0.101*** 0.124*** Size 0.0286***
(6.98) (8.80) (3.03)
Cfovol 0.167 0.0809 Current 0.00153
(1.58) (0.70) (0.34)
Intangible 0.321*** 0.352***
(5.10) (4.98)
Debtcov 0.148*** 0.194***
(4.96) (5.19)
Salescash 0.0504** 0.0190
(2.36) (0.89)
Lamda 0.121
(1.49)
Constant 2.172*** 1.440*** Constant 0.0157***
(23.97) (2.99) (5.12)
Industry Control Control
Year Control Control
Observations 4877 4853 4049
R-squared 0.501 0.478 0.487
Note: t-statistics are given in brackets.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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t = 9.16).
As documented in the main tests, substitution eﬀects are found to exist between collateral and high-quality
auditing. We use an auditor-switching test to further examine the relationship between collateral and high-
quality auditing. The auditor’s size (reputation) is used to build the auditor dummy. We predict that the pro-
portion of collateral will increase if the borrower switches from an international Big-4 or domestic Big-10 to
another auditor, and the proportion of collateral will decrease if the borrower switches from a non-interna-
tional Big-4 and non-domestic Big-10 to an international big-4 or domestic big-10. We do not examine the
Table 7
Propensity-score matching.
Treatment
method
Nearest-neighbor method Radius-matching method Divided-matching method Kernel-matching method
Treat
auditor = 1
Control
auditor = 0
Treat
auditor = 1
Control
auditor = 0
Treat
auditor = 1
Control
auditor = 0
Treat
auditor = 1
Control
auditor = 0
ATT 0.071 0.113 0.074 0.080
t-Statistic 4.308*** 9.898*** 6.732*** 9.112***
Frequency 200 200 50 200
Notes: (1) ATT represents the diﬀerence in the use of collateral between the two groups, namely average treatment eﬀects; (2) The
treatment group and control group are the high audit quality group and the low audit quality group, respectively; (3) we report the ATT
and t-statistics after matching.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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of switch does not aﬀect lenders’ decisions. Our predictions are fully conﬁrmed by the results of the regres-
sions. There are 251 cases of auditor-switching in our sample, of which 28 ﬁrms switch from high-quality audi-
tors to low quality auditors and 223 ﬁrms switch from low quality auditors to high-quality auditors.8 The
results shown in the third column support our predictions. The values of Change1 (0.0219, t = 1.86)
and Change2 (0.102, t = 3.14) indicate that when the ﬁrm moves from a low-quality auditor to a high-quality
auditor, the use of collateral decreases; when the high-quality auditor is replaced by a low-quality auditor, the
use of collateral increases.
The results of the propensity-score matching are listed in Table 7. There are two main stages. During the
ﬁrst stage, the observations are graded according to the control variables and their scores are then matched.
During the second stage, we calculate the diﬀerences between the control group and the treatment group,
namely the low audit quality group and the high audit quality group. We use four methods to calculate these
diﬀerences. The results of the second stage are listed in Table 7, and support our prediction that high audit
quality can reduce the use of collateral.
4.3.2. Results for H2 to H5
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 8 provide the results of testing hypotheses 2 and 3. We ﬁrst determine
whether the large shareholder has a high or low level of control rights, then we divide the sample accordingly
into two groups. We predict that in the high-control group, the high level of separation of control and own-
ership rights will weaken the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing, as it will increase
the opportunity for large shareholders to expropriate from minority shareholders, resulting in a higher credit
risk. In the low-control group, however, a high level of separation of control and ownership may strengthen
the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing by helping large shareholders to monitor
managers and reducing investment risk through diversiﬁcation. This will reduce credit risk and increase the
eﬃciency of investment. The results displayed in the second column of Table 8 show that in the high-control
group, collateral and high-quality auditing are always signiﬁcantly negatively related at the 1% level (0.103,
t-stat = 6.97), and that the auditor * wedge interaction is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level (0.0439, t-
stat = 2.12). This conﬁrms Hypothesis 2, in which we predict that the substitution eﬀects are weaker in the
high-control group when the degree of separation of control and ownership is high. However, there is no evi-
dence to support Hypothesis 3, which relates to the low-control group, as Auditor * wedge is not signiﬁcantly
negative (0.0251, t-stat = 0.94). This result may be attributed to the non-signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
entrenchment eﬀects and alignment eﬀects in the low-control group. Moreover, we ﬁnd Wedge to be signiﬁ-
cantly positive at the 5% level (0.0327, t-stat = 2.06).8 Model 4 is designed to calculate the changes between the current year and the previous year. We do not use the data for 2004 as a
benchmark; instead, we generate the lagged variables directly from the sample from 2005 to 2011. Consequently, our sample is reduced by
828 observations, from 4877 to 4049 observations.
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the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing to be stronger when the borrower is an SOE
rather than an NSOE, because SOEs have a lower credit risk, for several reasons. However, we also expect the
enhancement eﬀects of SOE to be weaker when the level of market development is high, because a more devel-
opedmarket is likely to reduce the government’s intervention in bank loans. Thiswill increase the credit risk faced
by SOEs; thereby reducing the diﬀerence in credit risk between SOEs and NSOEs. The results of the regression
fully conﬁrm our prediction. As Auditor * Soe is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level (0.0951, t-stat = 4.72),
the substitution eﬀects are stronger in SOEs than in NSOEs, so Hypothesis 4 is supported. In addition, Audi-
tor * Soe * Geo is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5% level (0.0412, t-stat = 2.24) which conﬁrms our prediction in
Hypothesis 5 that the enhancement eﬀects of SOEs are reduced when the level of market development is high.5. Sensitivity tests
5.1. Using Z-score model to evaluate credit risk
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5 are developed based on the grounds that SOEs are likely to have a lower credit risk
and that borrowers face a higher credit risk when large stockholders have substantial control rights and a high
degree of separation of control and ownership; and the latter predictions does not apply to the low control
rights group. In this section, we use Altman’s (1968) Z-score model to validate our reasoning by examining
the diﬀerences in Z-scores between the two groups, as a lower Z-score indicates a higher credit risk.
The Z-score model is as follows.Z-score ¼ 1:2ðcurrent assets=total assetsÞ þ 1:4ðequity-capital stockÞ=total assets
þ 3:3ðEBIT=total assetsÞ þ 0:6ðstock-market capitalization=total liabilityÞ
þ 0:99ðsales revenue=total assetsÞZ-score is used as the dependent variable, with the nature of the ultimate controller, the degree of separa-
tion of control and ownership, and several control variables on the right-hand side of the equation. The con-
trol variables comprise ﬁrm size, ﬁrm leverage, current ratio, return on assets, interest coverage, the number of
years since the ﬁrm was established, a dummy variable for loss, and variables controlling for year and industry
factors. We ﬁnd that SOEs have higher Z-scores than NSOEs. The Z-score for the high control rights group is
not signiﬁcantly lower when the separation of control and ownership is greater, but the Z-score for the low
control rights group is signiﬁcantly higher when the separation of control and ownership is greater. The results
are generally consistent with our predictions, but are not reported in this paper.5.2. Alternative measures of collateral, large-shareholder control rights, degree of separation of control and
ownership, and the level of market development
In our main tests, we use the proportion of collateral as the explained variable and a 30% measure, a 2/3
measure and the median as criteria to build variables for large-shareholder control rights, separation of con-
trol and ownership and market development. In this section, however, the proportion of collateral and guar-
antor loans is the explained variable. We use a 25% measure as the criterion to build a dummy variable for
large-shareholder control rights; then the mean and median are used as criteria to build a dummy variable
for separation of control and ownership, and the mean and 2/3 measure as the criteria for a market-develop-
ment dummy variable. We use these alternative measures to regress Models 1, 2, and 3 and, reexamine all the
ﬁve hypotheses. Our predictions are generally supported but the results are not reported in this paper.5.3. Measurement of audit quality
In the main tests, we use the international Big-4 and the domestic Big-10 measures as a combined proxy for
audit quality. We also use discretional accruals, calculated using the modiﬁed Jones model to verify the proxy.
Table 8
Results for H2 to H5.
(1) (3) (6) (4)
H2,3 H2 H3 H4,5
Full sample High control Low control Full sample
Auditor 0.0922*** 0.103*** 0.0365* 0.0271*
(7.70) (6.97) (1.85) (1.84)
Soe 0.129*** 0.148*** 0.0819*** 0.103***
(13.52) (11.16) (5.78) (9.62)
Wedge 0.0153 0.0147 0.0327** 0.0281***
(1.49) (1.11) (2.06) (3.20)
Auditor * Soe 0.0951***
(4.72)
Auditor * Soe * Geo 0.0412**
(2.24)
Auditor * Wedge 0.0258 0.0439** 0.0251
(1.56) (2.12) (0.94)
Lev 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.133*** 0.165***
(6.40) (4.13) (3.69) (6.11)
Roa 0.514*** 0.695*** 0.256** 0.535***
(5.91) (5.69) (2.11) (6.16)
Size 0.0764*** 0.0779*** 0.0595*** 0.0758***
(18.40) (14.71) (8.65) (18.27)
Growth 0.00454 0.0123 0.0194 0.00390
(0.24) (0.51) (0.66) (0.21)
Current 0.0360*** 0.0301*** 0.0269** 0.0321***
(4.61) (2.84) (2.39) (4.07)
Age 0.00638*** 0.00266* 0.00392*** 0.00677***
(6.52) (1.92) (2.64) (6.92)
Intcov 0.000175 0.000140 0.000516 0.000168
(0.74) (0.47) (1.35) (0.72)
Geo 0.0402*** 0.0628*** 0.0241** 0.0503***
(5.22) (6.25) (2.05) (5.85)
Guaran 0.617*** 0.544*** 0.725*** 0.621***
(52.76) (37.09) (38.72) (53.13)
Ltdebt 0.122*** 0.114*** 0.0796*** 0.131***
(8.73) (6.34) (3.60) (9.13)
Cfovol 0.00373 0.0421 0.0820 0.00605
(0.04) (0.30) (0.52) (0.06)
Intangible 0.303*** 0.397*** 0.237** 0.265***
(4.80) (4.86) (2.48) (4.20)
Debtcov 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.112** 0.167***
(5.58) (4.34) (2.44) (5.54)
Salescash 0.0272 0.0635** 0.0235 0.0313
(1.27) (2.25) (0.73) (1.46)
Constant 2.151*** 2.211*** 1.870*** 2.125***
(23.78) (19.29) (12.46) (23.42)
Industry Control Control Control Control
Year Control Control Control Control
Observations 4877 2935 1942 4877
R-squared 0.484 0.469 0.514 0.489
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ﬁrms as a proxy for audit quality to test all of the hypotheses. Our predictions are generally supported.6. Conclusion
In this study, we attempt to ascertain from the perspective of lenders whether external auditing contributes
to borrowers’ bank loans by reducing collateral requirements, as suggested in the literature. We also aim to
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ultimate controller and the borrowers’ ownership structure. Our results show that lenders regard collateral
and high-quality auditing as alternative means of preventing credit risk. In China’s institutional context, single
shareholders are dominant, shareholders are highly concentrated and lenders are ineﬀectively protected. In
this setting, the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality auditing are greater in SOEs than
NSOEs, as SOEs have lower credit risk. We also notice that when the market development level is higher,
the supportive eﬀects of government’s intervention in SOEs’ bank loans are reduced, the credit risk faced
by SOEs is stronger and the enhancement eﬀects of substitution in SOEs are weaker. In addition, when the
large shareholder has considerable control rights, the substitution eﬀects between collateral and high-quality
auditing are weakened if the borrower has a high level of separation of control and ownership. When the large
shareholder can control the borrower and there is a high level of separation of control and ownership the
entrenchment and agency eﬀects are stronger than the alignment eﬀects, so the borrower faces a higher credit
risk. In contrast, a greater separation of control and ownership does not result in stronger alignment eﬀects
than entrenchment and agency eﬀects in the group with fewer control rights. Our evidence shows that
high-quality auditing and collateral are regarded as alternatives when lenders make self-protection decisions,
but that degree of their substitutability is adjusted by lenders according to the borrower’s level of credit risk.
To further examine our predictions, we use alternative measures, an auditor-switching test and Altman’s Z-
score model as sensitivity tests. We also use Heckman’s two-stage regression model to address self-selection
problems associated with auditor choice, and propensity score matching to deal with endogeneity. Our predic-
tions are generally well supported by the results of the main tests and the sensitivity tests. Finally, the limita-
tions of our study should be acknowledged. First, although the international Big-4 and domestic Big-10
measures of audit quality generally support our predictions, and we conduct sensitivity tests to examine these
measures further, it possible that our results contain measurement errors. Second, we control for debt matu-
rity, then examine the relationship between collateral and external auditing, which may lead to the problem of
endogeneity caused by interest rates. However, previous literature shows that interest rates in China are tightly
regulated by the government, preventing lenders from using interest rates to distinguish between the high- and
low-risk borrowers. Due to this limited functionality (Chen et al., 2012; Podpiera, 2006; Koivu, 2009), we do
not use interest rates as a control variable in our models, nor do we conduct further tests to examine this
problem.
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